Model-based Intrusion Assessment in Common Lisp

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Categories and Subject Descriptors K [6]: 5

Keywords computer security, intrusion detection, report fusion, IDS fusion, IDS correlation, lisp

1. Introduction

We describe the Scyllarus system, which performs Intrusion Detection System (IDS) fusion, using Bayes nets and qualitative probability.1 IDSes are systems that sense intrusions in computer networks and hosts. IDS fusion is the problem of fusing reports from multiple IDSes scattered around a computer network we wish to defend, into a coherent overall picture of network status. Scyllarus treats the problem of IDS fusion as an abduction problem, formalized using Bayes nets and Knowledge-based Model Construction (KBMC). Because of the coarseness of the data available, Scyllarus uses a qualitative framework, based on System-Z+. Qualitative Bayes nets allow Scyllarus to exploit the strengths of probabilistic reasoning, without excessive knowledge acquisition and without committing to a misleading level of accuracy in its conclusions. The Scyllarus system gave excellent results on a medium-sized corporate network, where it was in continuous use for approximately four years, and was validated in a DARPA-funded assessment. Under US Federal government funding, we are now working to adapt Scyllarus to analyze detection reports from sensors monitoring very high speed (10 - 100 Gb/second) networks in a project called “SMITE.”

Common Lisp (CL) has provided significant benefits to the development and deployment of Scyllarus. Most basically, it enabled the assembly of an ambitiously complex system, which uses multiple inference techniques at different stages of its processing: clustering, that is partly based on information encoded in its ontology, and partly in CLOS methods and data-dependency based logical reasoning combined with cost-based search for explanations (using qualitative probability) in order to weigh explanations against each other. The Lisp garbage collector allows the Scyllarus analyzer to run online indefinitely, despite its continuous construction of complex graphs of interrelated events and entities. Lisp also provided a good framework for integrating the ontology we developed using the Protege ontology editor. Finally, the ability to debug and hot-patch our algorithms while in operation has proven invaluable. Nevertheless, all is not for the best in the best of all possible worlds; we also report some rough spots in our use of CL in what has been a relatively long-lived research software project (approximately 9 years).

1.1 Intrusion detection

The function of Scyllarus is to take reports from multiple intrusion detection algorithms and fuse them into a coherent picture of the state of the defended network (together with some information about the environment in which that network operates). To perform this task, Scyllarus uses Bayesian (probabilistic) reasoning, primarily to answer two (interrelated) questions:

1. Is the notification (are the notifications) that Scyllarus has received from the algorithms likely to reflect a false positive?

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1The Scyllarus system is named after the Mantis shrimp, an animal that detects its prey with one of the world’s most complex retinas. It is also one of the most formidable animals, for its weight, smashing its prey with heavily calcified clubs. “Mantis shrimp can break through aquarium glass with a single strike from this weapon.”(Wikipedia)
2. Is there a benign explanation that can explain away the notification or notifications that Scyllarus has received? For example, a flood of SMTP messages with duplicated content from a particular host might be a sign that that host has been compromised and turned into a spam bot. However, it’s also possible that the host is a bona fide mailing list server, and it’s just sending out the day’s digest messages.

Because the domain does not afford us access to good statistics, we do not use conventional Bayesian reasoning. Instead, we use a qualitative abstraction of probabilistic reasoning, very similar to the big-O scheme familiar to computer scientists, System-Z+ (Goldszmidt and Pearl 1992a,b, 1996).

Existing ID Ses are not designed to work together, as part of a suite of sensors. Instead, each program generates a separate, and often voluminous, stream of reports, and fusing them into a coherent view of the current situation is left as an exercise for the user. Scyllarus overcomes the limitations of both individual ID Ses, and unstructured groups of ID Ses. Instead of simply joining together multiple alert streams, Scyllarus provides a unified intrusion situation assessment. Critical to this unification is Scyllarus’s Intrusion Reference Model (IRM), which contains information about the configuration of the site to be protected (including the ID Ses), the site’s security policies and objectives, and the phenomena of interest (intrusion events).

Data reduction is a primary goal of Scyllarus. IDS owners regularly either ignore or partially disable them, unable to absorb the massive stream of reports. To get a sense of the gravity of this problem, see Figure 1, which shows how Scyllarus was able to winnow the flow of reports in a small corporate network.

Often the most damning weakness of an IDS is a high false positive rate. In general, with any sensor, one must pay in false positives for whatever is gained in sensitivity. One way to overcome this limitation is to assemble a suite of sensors. This can be a very efficient way to overcome the problem of false positives, as long as we can find sensors that fail relatively independently.

1.2 SMITE project

The Scyllarus project was begun at Honeywell in 1999 and has been intermittently active since then. Current development is being done in the context of the SMITE system, a BBN project funded by DARPA’s Scalable Network Monitoring (SNM) program. The SNM program’s goal is to develop new approaches to network-based monitoring that deliver performance capabilities orders of magnitude better than conventional approaches, regardless of the network’s size and computational burden. BBN’s approach deploys pipelined systems as data collectors on networks with multi-gigabit speeds. Special-purpose algorithms are being developed that are able to detect intrusion-relevant events while keeping up with the network flow. The events are aggregated and fused by Scyllarus. See Figure 2 for an overview of the SMITE system’s architecture. Current work on Scyllarus aims at optimizing it to be able to keep up with the flow of events from the hardware-based SMITE sensors, expected to cover 2 to 3 orders of magnitude more traffic.

2. Scenario of Use

The malign explanation is not the only possible one, however. Figure 3 shows that there is an alternative, benign explanation. It is possible that what has really happened is that a new service has been installed on this host (“Legit Svc Added”) — that would account for new ports being opened. However, if a new service was legitimately added, we would also expect to see a change in the system’s (overt) configuration, but we are not seeing that. On balance, the “compromised host” explanation is considered possible, but not especially likely.

Figure 4 shows how the situation might evolve with the arrival of more evidence for intrusion. Here we see that not only is the host in question accepting connections to a new port, but we have also seen that it is initiating a lot of connections outward, “Initiates Conns,” which we infer from reports from two sensors. Typically, we would not expect a server to be initiating outward connections. Intuitively, the pattern of inference is as follows: the new legitimate service explanation would account for the newly opened ports, but would not account for the connection initiation. However, a compromised host (perhaps a host that has been added to a botnet) would explain both symptoms.

3. Scyllarus Architecture

The architecture of Scyllarus, divided into four modules, is depicted in Figure 5. The first is the input mod-
Figure 1. Scyllarus workload reduction.

ule, made up of the Sensor converters (or “verters”) and the Report concentrator. The verters take reports from IDSes and other sensors, translate them into Scyllarus-specific data structures, and hand them off to the report concentrator for eventual storage and analysis. The second is the Cluster Preprocessor (CP), which assembles together sets of reports that could correspond to a single underlying event or process. The CP collects reports that could tend to either reinforce or disconfirm particular hypotheses. The CP builds structures that are similar to belief networks (Pearl 1988). The third component, and the last of the active components, the Event Assessor (EA) applies the logic of System-Z+ to evaluate competing explanations (e.g., mailserver versus spam bot) for the reports. The final core component of Scyllarus is the Intrusion Reference Model (IRM), a knowledge base describing the environment in which Scyllarus operates, and which supports the processing done by the CP and EA.

4. Scyllarus input processing

The Scyllarus architecture was developed to flexibly accommodate reports from a diverse and changing set of sensors (primarily IDSes). One may plug arbitrary sets of translators into Scyllarus. These “verters” are small translator programs that translate IDS reports, which do not come in standardized formats, into a standard Scyllarus input report. The verters must be written anew for each IDS, but the effort is not too substantial. For the SMITE project, we have the advantage

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4 Even when we found sensors that complied with some standard, such as IDMEF, the standard wasn’t helpful, because it did not specify semantics sufficiently to allow us to simply accept the reports.
of a standard report format (implemented as a reporting library to be compiled into each of the sensors) negotiated between the sensor and correlation teams, so that we need only a single SMITE vertex.

After the reports have been translated into Scyllarus format, they pass from the vertices to the Report Concentrator. The Report Concentrator receives incoming reports from IDSes and buffers the reports, ensuring that the system remains responsive while not losing data. The Report Concentrator provides a real-time feed of reports to subscribers, the most important of which are the event database and the Cluster Preprocessor.

5. Cluster Preprocessor

The Cluster Preprocessor reads raw reports posted by the IDSs, and using background information provided by the IRM, a model of the protected network and a key for interpreting IDS messages, produces clusters of IDS reports to be evaluated as events explaining the reports. A single IDS report may give rise to one or more such clusters.

The Cluster Preprocessor follows a simple processing loop:

1. Read the next IDS report from a socket stream connected to the Scyllarus Report Concentrator.
2. Match the IDS-provided report type to one or more interpretations known to Scyllarus. Each provides a hypothetical event purporting to explain the report. Scyllarus has models for various common network and host-based IDSs.
3. Search through already hypothesized events for ones that would explain each interpretation of the new report. Criteria for consistency vary from one type of event to another, and are specified in the IRM as a set of “event test” objects to be satisfied. Some basic criteria include:
• occurrence within an acceptable temporal window
• directed at the same target host and/or port
• apparently originating from the same source
• sharing a common user or login session

4. Propose new events as needed when existing ones are inconsistent with the new report.

5. Assemble new (or recently modified) events into other larger-scale events. This allows Scyllarus to consider multi-step attacks. Further model-based tests for consistency are applied to this clustering.

6. Submit new or modified events and their supporting reports for evaluation.

The report stream (as well as other communications with Scyllarus) is SSL-encrypted on Lisp platforms that support it. This preserves confidentiality and integrity of the system, but it also is important to avoid incidentally triggering new suppurious secondary alerts from network IDSs that may see the Scyllarus reporting traffic on the wire.

Identifying Independent Subsets of Events  The Cluster Preprocessor is driven entirely by incoming reports. It spoils events that need likelihood evaluation to the EA, but does not halt clustering to wait for assessment to complete, since this evaluation time may be relatively long–extracting the most likely interpretations from a very large ATMS network may take seconds.

Instead, the EA runs in a separate thread and evaluates independent clusters of events as its processing budget allows. The fundamental independence criterion is that the set of events implicitly defines a directed acyclic graph. Events are linked to other events and to reports according to the following relationships:

Supporters $E \rightarrow R$. This is a relationship between an event and an IDS report that provides direct evidence for it. For example, a certain network IDS rule that is triggered by a sequence of bytes commonly

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure3}
\caption{Alternative explanations and the observations they might cause.}
\end{figure}
found in propagation of the Peacomm trojan could support an event hypothesizing the malware infection of the target host with Peacomm.

**Components** $E(\text{whole}) \rightarrow E(\text{component})$. This is a relationship between events and other events that might be component parts of them. For example, one component of a DNS cache poisoning attack is the sending of a flood of DNS queries.

**Manifestations** $E(\text{underlying}) \rightarrow E(\text{manifestation})$. This is a relationship between an event and other events that might occur because the first event is occurring. For example, a worm’s propagation might manifest as repeated content transmission from the attacking host.

**Specializes** $E(\text{specific}) \rightarrow E(\text{more general})$. Different IDS algorithms operate at different levels of resolution. This link is a relationship between one proposed event and a more specific proposed event (e.g. induced by a more precise type of IDS) that could be identical.

The graph is defined by the closure under the above four links (and their inverses) of the set of events given to the assessor. Typically, this graph will have many connected components that are not connected with each other. The connected components are the independent subsets that the EA operates on separately.

Scyllarus finds connected components using a standard depth-first graph search using the above link types. Additional link types could be added, if that were desirable, as long as the graph were to remain acyclic. For incremental assessment, the search for connected components is slightly different, as discussed in the section devoted to incremental assessment.

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**Figure 4.** More evidence of intrusion arrives.
6. Event Assessor

The Event Assessor uses qualitative probabilistic/Bayesian reasoning to assess the likelihood of various event hypotheses. In the current Scyllarus architecture, the EA is invoked by the Scyllarus Cluster Preprocessor. The EA accepts as input clustered event hypotheses, together with their supporting reports. The EA builds qualitative probabilistic inference networks corresponding to the clustered reports and events. It uses these networks to compute posterior surprise levels (qualitative likelihoods) for the event hypotheses. These surprise levels are recorded in the event structures, and may be written into the IRM database for persistent storage.

The EA must perform four primary computational tasks:

1. Identify independent sub-graphs in the network defined by the event and report structures and the links between them. This is done with depth-first search.

2. Build Bayes networks and identify evidence interpretations in these networks. The Bayes nets are implemented as ATMS dependency networks. The ATMS computes interpretations corresponding to the Bayes networks using its labeling algorithms.

3. Extract the set of most likely interpretations from an ATMS network. This is done using search algorithms. We search for interpretations of minimal cost. The solution used is primarily one of depth-first iterative deepening, although some special cases are handled differently.

4. Extract surprise levels from the most likely interpretations. Currently, we simply differentiate between three classes of events: plausible events, that appear in some of the most likely interpretations, unlikely or implausible events, that do not appear in any of the most likely interpretations and likely events, which are plausible events and, additionally, whose negation never appears in a likely interpretation. That is, for a plausible event, E, it is also possible that not(E) is plausible. An event E is likely if E is plausible and not(E) is implausible. Extracting surprise levels may simply be done by examining the interpretations generated in step 3.
6.1 Underlying Theory: System-Z+ Qualitative Probability

We have taken an approach, based on qualitative probabilities, that shares the basic structure of normal probability theory but abstracts the actual probabilities used. We did this primarily to simplify knowledge acquisition and make it as simple as possible to incorporate new IDSes into the Scyllarus architecture. This approach may also permit cheaper computations than the normal probability calculus, but that remains to be seen.

Our approach is based on System-Z+, developed by Moisés Goldszmidt and Judea Pearl (1996). In System-Z+, events are given a natural number rank, \( \kappa \), that corresponds to their degree of surprise (e.g., a rank of one is more surprising than zero). The semantics of this scheme comes from a set of probability distributions in which the probabilities are polynomials in some infinitesimal \( \epsilon \). In this scheme, the \( \kappa \) rank corresponds to the exponent of the leading term of the polynomial. The scheme is similar to the “big-O” notation used for evaluating computational complexity in computer science.

In practical terms, the effect of this semantics is to give System-Z+ a qualitative flavor by providing a “ladder” of events of qualitatively different orders of likelihood. Of course, we sacrifice exactness in doing so; we lose the ability to talk about events being slightly more or less likely. However, this sacrifice of exactness is not an issue in the Scyllarus intrusion detection application.

The EA must combine the judgments of a wide variety of intrusion detection systems (and potentially other relevant information sources), that use widely varying sources of information and algorithms. Further, in general we will not have access to the internals of these sensors. In such an environment, it is not realistic to expect good models of the response of these sensors; in particular, exact measures of \( P(\text{sensor response} | \text{event}) \) are not available. There have been some attempts to investigate sensor response (e.g., the studies conducted by Lincoln Labs (Lippmann et al. 2000)), but the results seem heavily dependent on the context in which the sensors are deployed.

The issue of prior probabilities also militates against the use of exact probabilities. In order to use an exact Bayesian method, we would need not only the detection probability, \( P(\text{sensor response} | \text{event}) \), and the false alarm probability, \( P(\text{sensor response} | \neg \text{event}) \), but also \( P(\text{event}) \), a measure of the prior probabilities of the events that interest us, in this case the attacks and the benign events that can cause false positives. Even in the most constrained environments, the probabilities of the various attacks, are unlikely to be available to us, and the Scyllarus system is designed for application across a wide variety of enterprises. Further, the probability distributions for benign events are likely to be of odd forms (e.g., one’s own network-mapping software runs at particular times of the day). So our solution must tolerate vague measures of likelihood.

Finally, in this domain, as with most practical applications of probabilistic updating, the effect of the evidence will usually overwhelm the effect of the prior likelihoods (e.g., (Pradhan et al. 1996)). So inexactitude in the quantities specified will not matter to our final conclusions.

As far as computation is concerned, we may apply the normal operation of probability theory: conditionalization, Bayes’ law, etc. However, the arithmetic operations we must change. Rather than multiplying probabilities, we add degrees of surprise. Rather than adding probabilities, we use min. Goldszmidt and Pearl (1996, p. 59) provide the following substitutions in their paper:

\[
\begin{align*}
P(\omega) &= \sum_{\phi \in \omega} P(\phi) & \kappa(\omega) &= \min_{\phi \in \omega} P(\phi) \\
P(\omega) + P(\neg \omega) &= 1 & \kappa(\omega) &= 0 \lor \kappa(\neg \omega) = 1 \\
P(\omega | \phi) &= \frac{P(\omega \land \phi)}{P(\phi)} & \kappa(\omega | \phi) &= \kappa(\omega \land \phi) - \kappa(\phi)
\end{align*}
\]

Instead of the probability of an event being the sum of the probabilities of the primitive outcomes that make up that event, the degree of surprise of an event is the minimum of the degrees of surprise of the primitive outcomes that make it up. Instead of having the probabilities of mutually exclusive and exhaustive events sum to one, at least one of a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive events must be unsurprising. Finally, we have an analog of Bayes’ law in which the normalizing operation consists of subtraction rather than division.

We used Bayesian networks to help us in modeling and solving the correlation problem. Bayesian networks are ways of graphically capturing probabilistic reasoning. They are useful in expert systems because they simplify knowledge acquisition and, by capturing (conditional) independences, simplify computation (Pearl, 1988). In particular, in the domain of intrusion detection, Bayes nets help us capture several important patterns or probabilistic reasoning:

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• Reasoning based on evidence merging;
• “Explaining away” reports by alternative explanations. E.g., if a benign event accounts for a number of reports, those reports will be explained away, and no longer provide support for more alarming hypotheses.
• Abstraction reasoning that employs the subclass/superclass relationships in the event dictionary.
• Part/whole reasoning, to recognize complex composite events.
• Distinguishing between judgments that are based on different sensor bases and those that use the same sensor. This helps us distinguish between cases when two sensors provide support for each other and when we simply have redundant reports (e.g., two network intrusion detection systems using exactly the same algorithm that see the same traffic, at two different points).

A Bayesian network is a directed, acyclic graph (DAG) depicting a set of random variables. Edges between nodes in the DAG represent causal influences. Using a Bayesian network, we can capture a joint distribution factorized into unconditional probabilities for root nodes and conditional probability tables for non-root nodes. The conditional probability tables contain probability distributions for the child nodes, conditioned on all the values of their parents. For a thorough, but readable, introduction to Bayesian networks, we recommend Charniak’s (1992) “Bayesian Networks Without Tears.”

There are a number of efficient algorithms for finding the posterior distributions of Bayesian networks, conditional on observations of some of the random variables. These algorithms may readily be adapted to provide posterior \( \kappa \) rankings instead of probabilities.

### 6.2 System-Z+ and the ATMS

The Scyllarus Event Assessor (EA) does System-Z+ Bayes net inference by representing the Bayes nets in a Assumption-based Truth Maintenance System (ATMS) with weighted assumptions, and finding minimum cost environments for the ATMS networks. We adopted the ATMS approach simply because the ATMS code was readily available, and we expected later to replace the ATMS with a special-purpose System-Z+ Bayes net evaluator. However, with the exception of some pathological cases, which we handle specially, System-Z+ inference has never been a bottleneck in Scyllarus.

An ATMS (deKleer 1986) is a propositional logic database with data dependencies or justifications, that record the derivation of the literals from distinguished assumptions. An ATMS network is a directed hypergraph whose vertices are a set of literals, \( L \). Among the literals are a distinguished contradictory node, \( \bot \), and a subset of assumptions, \( A \subseteq L \). The justifications are a set of hyperedges, \( J : 2^L \times L \), whose tails are sets of literals, the justifiers, and whose head is a literal, the justificand. Each justification is a boolean constraint indicating that the justifiers entail the justificand. Using the justifications, the ATMS uses a boolean constraint propagation algorithm to compute a labeling for the set of literals. Each literal is labeled with a set of environments. Each environment, \( E_i \subseteq A \), is a minimal set of assumptions that, taken together, entails the literal. Justifications whose justificand is the \( \bot \) node are used to identify inconsistent environments. We have used the ATMS code supplied in Forbus and DeKleer’s textbook (Forbus and DeKleer 1993).

ATMSes can be used to encode Bayes networks (Charniak and Goldman 1988; Provan 1989). Each value assignment to a random variable in the Bayes net is represented by a literal. Each conditional or unconditional probability in the Bayes net is represented by an assumption. For example, in a Bayes net with the (boolean) nodes \( A, B, C \) and edges \( A \rightarrow C, B \rightarrow C \), there will be literals \( l_A, l_B, l_C, l_{\overline{A}}, l_{\overline{B}}, l_{\overline{C}} \) and assumptions:

\[
\begin{align*}
& a_A, a_{\overline{A}}, \\
& a_B, a_{\overline{B}}, \\
& a_{C|AB}, a_{C|\overline{A}B}, a_{C|A\overline{B}}, a_{C|\overline{A}\overline{B}}, \\
& a_{\overline{C}|AB}, a_{\overline{C}|A\overline{B}}, a_{\overline{C}|\overline{A}B}, a_{\overline{C}|\overline{A}\overline{B}}
\end{align*}
\]

There will also be justifications representing the probabilistic entailments. For example, \( \langle a_A \rightarrow l_A \rangle \) and \( \langle a_{\overline{A}} \rightarrow l_{\overline{A}} \rangle \) illustrate the representation of root nodes and unconditional priors in the Bayes net. The conditional probabilities of internal nodes are represented using justifications like these:

\[
\langle l_A, l_B, a_{C|AB} \rightarrow l_C \rangle, \langle l_A, l_B, a_{C|AB} \rightarrow l_{\overline{C}} \rangle, \ldots
\]

We also have justifications to ensure consistency, e.g.: \( \langle a_A, a_{\overline{A}} \rightarrow \bot \rangle \).

With the above encoding, the ATMS algorithm will compute labelings that represent the prior probabilities.
in the Bayes network. In the above example, the literals will be labeled as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
  l_A & \{ \{ a_A \} \} \\
  l_{\overline{A}} & \{ \{ a_{\overline{A}} \} \} \\
  l_B & \{ \{ a_B \} \} \\
  l_{\overline{B}} & \{ \{ a_{\overline{B}} \} \} \\
  l_C & \{ a_A, a_B, a_{C|AB} \}, \{ a_A, a_{\overline{A}}, a_{C|\overline{AB}} \}, \{ a_{\overline{A}}, a_B, a_{C|\overline{AB}} \}, \{ a_{\overline{A}}, a_{\overline{B}}, a_{C|\overline{AB}} \}, \\
  l_{\overline{C}} & \ldots
\end{align*}
\]

From the above labelings we can recover the prior probabilities by multiplying together the conditional and unconditional probabilities associated with each assumption node. Posterior probabilities can be computed by collecting the set of environments consistent with the observation set and normalizing the prior probabilities accordingly.

Computing System-Z+ \( \kappa \) values may be done in a similar way, with some differences to account for the differences in the calculi. If we wish to find posterior \( \kappa \)s for a set of observations \( \omega \), we must find the set of minimum-cost environments consistent with \( \omega \). Unfortunately, this cannot simply be done by combining the labels of the literals in \( \omega \). For one thing, the environments in the labels for the different literals are not guaranteed to be independent.

We may find the environments we want using a search algorithm, whose search states are pairs of environments (sets of assumptions) and sets of reports.

1. let \( \mathcal{R} \) be the set of reports; let \( O \) be the openlist
2. \( O := \text{list}(\emptyset, \mathcal{R}) \)
3. choose \( s = \langle E, R \rangle \) from \( O \)
4. if \( R = \emptyset \) then \( s \) is a solution
5. choose a report, \( r \in R \)
6. for each environment, \( E' \in \text{label}(r) \):
7. unless \( \text{nogood}(E' \cup E) \) add \( \langle E' \cup E, R - r \rangle \) to \( O \).

The set of environments produced by this search algorithm are sufficient to partition the set of events into likely, plausible, and unlikely subsets: An event is likely if it is entailed by all the minimum-\( \kappa \) environments. An event is plausible, if both it and its negation appear in some minimum-\( \kappa \) environments. An event is unlikely if it appears in none of the minimum-\( \kappa \) environments.

Some notes are worth making: First, we must find all the minimum-cost (minimum \( \kappa \)) solution environments. We are free to choose whatever search method we wish to execute the above search. Initially we used a naive \( A^* \) algorithm; later we switched to depth-first iterative deepening in order to avoid excessive memory requirements. For greater efficiency, we perform inference on individual closed subgraphs of the ATMS network, rather than the entire network.

The CP builds networks of events and reports with the following structures:

**Event \( \rightarrow \) report links** Associated with each report is a set of events that it supports (i.e., provides evidence for).

**Event \( \rightarrow \) event part-of links** There are a limited number of exploits that have distinguished parts that can be detected independently.

**Event \( \rightarrow \) event specialization links** Because the different IDSes have different classifications of events, it is possible that one IDS will report an event \( E \), while another will report an event \( E' \) where \( E' \) is a more specific event class than \( E \).

To summarize, we build an ATMS network that, for each record, considers the possibility that the record corresponds to a true detection or a false positive. We also represent the causal and logical relations among the different events in the set of events. Note that this algorithm can either be used to create an ATMS network for the full set of events in the database, or any closed subset of the set of events, for incremental reasoning.

We found two special cases that were challenging for EA inference. One was the simple case of an ATMS network with only a single event. While this is a trivial case of inference, it caused problems when there were many reports (in some cases, thousands of reports). We wrote a special-purpose System-Z+ solver for such networks, significantly improving throughput. Another optimization we made was to filter symmetrical environments out of the search; again this provided significant inference speedups.

7. Intrusion Reference Model

The process of knowledge-based model construction is driven largely by extensive models of existing IDSes.
The task of putting the various sorts of IDS reports on a common semantic footing has proved more challenging than expected. There is little consistency in terminology between (or even within) IDSes and often quite different principles of detection are employed, making nominally similar messages less than fully comparable.

An extensive ontology for expressing the IRM has evolved over several versions of Scyllarus to become the foundation of our approach to this problem. All of the IRM concepts are expressed in this modular ontology, maintained in the Protégé (Noy et al. 2001) tool. Part of this ontology is used to model the protected computers and network, while other parts are devoted to the characteristics of the defenses. In particular, an IDS ontology module exists in the IRM for each sort of IDS supported. These models pertain both to hypothesis formation and evaluation, so we will discuss them briefly here.

Each type of IDS is capable of emitting a range of different reports describing some aspect of a possible intrusion it has observed. Commonly these different messages will be derived from different discrete elements such as rules or detection modules within the IDS. Some have a repertoire of just a few messages (e.g. firewalls) while others have thousands (e.g. Snort). Scyllarus maintains an explicit model of each message generating element.

An IDS report will usually mention three sorts of details. First, it will almost always contain an identifying string that describes the generic exploit or vulnerability implicated. An example is the report generated by snort rule with SID 1635, “POP3 APOP overflow attempt”, which is an attempt to exploit a vulnerability in an XMail POP server, allowing the attacker to execute arbitrary commands via overflowing an internal buffer.
This sometimes comes with a standardized citation of a cataloged vulnerability, such as a code from CVE, the Common Vulnerability Enumeration (CVE). The aforementioned vulnerability has such a number, CVE-2000-0841. However many IDS reports do not have such an association, or the association is not unique, and we have had to rely on the vendor-specific identifiers. In cases where this identifier has not been unique, we have modified it to make it so, since we are interested in the performance characteristics of individual rules or detection modules. Cases of differential performance within a single type of IDS have arisen, for example, multiple signatures that diagnose the presence of a particular computer virus wherein some rules are highly specific while others are prone to be triggered by normal traffic.

Two other details that nearly all IDS reports provide are the identifiers of the initiator and intended victim of the attack. This may include a particular host identifier, a network address, a user name, process identifier, etc. depending on the type of IDS and nature of the observation. In network IDSES the designation of source and destination in the observed network packets usually, but not always, corresponds to the attacker and victim. Sometimes the easiest way to observe an attack is by detecting the response of the victim, thus reversing the usual network order. Scyllarus uses the IDS models to normalize these designations.

Each message-generating element in a supported type of IDS has one or more models in the IDS specific ontology module. These models, which we call report signatures, are causal interpretations of the report in terms of the ontology. A signature is a template that describes a possible attack or other event that may give rise to the given sort of report. It uses several extensive hierarchies of IRM concepts to do so. The first, is a taxonomy of operations. Operations are elementary actions on the protected system that may be undertaken for good or ill, such as reading a file, starting a process, or executing a step in a protocol. Scyllarus has an a-kind-of hierarchy listing hundreds of operations. A different IRM taxonomy models the possible intentions of a causal agent. The intent may be specified in a report signature to cast a benign or malevolent interpretation of the operation. The intent classification also provides a rough measure of the seriousness of the event. Modeled intentions vary from specific sorts of denial of service, the seizing of privileges, as well as administrative (wholesome) intentions such as “achieve file-server archival backup to tape.”

Many signatures also cite specific victim software or systems, vulnerabilities (Scyllarus incorporates CVE and other classification schemes), or certain “malware” (malicious programs) that are implicated. An important part of the signature model is the qualitative false positive rate of generating element, and the presumed rarity of the interpretation. Various other details of the representation are omitted here for brevity.

8. Experience

Scyllarus was used to monitor an operational network of over 500 workstations and servers using three different types of network intrusion detector and two different types of host intrusion detectors located at various points in the network over a period of 4 years, at which time the sensors were relocated to a small test network with limited access to network traffic.5 Over the period of its use, Scyllarus proved itself to be a substantial advance in the state of the art for IDS fusion.

Scyllarus routinely handled quiet day traffic of 10,000 – 20,000 IDS reports per day. On more “exciting” days, the traffic was considerably heavier; e.g., on the day of the release of the Code Red worm, Scyllarus received more than 1,000,000 reports.

We tested Scyllarus with controlled exploits on our network and the system has responded appropriately. We were also able to detect an episode of penetration testing conducted without warning by an independent security team.

In 2003, the ability of Scyllarus attacks was demonstrated in an evaluation conducted as part of the DARPA Cyber Panel program (Haines et al. 2003). In this evaluation, a number of network attacks were launched by a dedicated Red Team in a simulated warfare planning environment.

Scyllarus addresses the information overload faced by IDS users. On quiet days Scyllarus is able to winnow the flood of reports down to a handful of events that are worthy of investigation. See Figure 1 for representative data on Scyllarus’s report filtering.

9. Related Work

SecurityFocus has developed the Attack Registry and Intelligence Service (ARIS) (ARIS). The ARIS extractor collects IDS reports from four different IDSES, for-
mats them in XML, and presents them in an incident console. However, it makes no attempts to fuse the reports or weigh the evidence for and against them.

MetaSTAT is a fusion system that is built on a set of STAT-based IDSes (Vigna et al. 2001). STAT is a signature-based IDS that detects events by matching against extended finite-state event models. MetaSTAT uses finite-state models of across-sensor events to consume at a higher level the events generated by lower-level sensors. MetaSTAT does not attempt to judge the plausibility of different events.

EMERALD/eBayes (Valdes and Skinner 2001) fusion is the most similar to Scyllarus. The eBayes sensors are Bayes net-based, and the correlation approach allows “upstream” sensors to adjust the priors on “downstream” sensors. eBayes fusion is limited to clustering together alerts that meet a similarity criterion; they do not have models of high-level events as in the Scyllarus IRM.

Prelude Correlator (Vandoorselaere 2008) is part of the open source Prelude IDS information system, and allows users to analyze reports sent to Prelude from compatible IDSs. Users provide rules written in Lua (Ierusalimschy et al. 2006), a scripting language inspired by Scheme and Icon. Its function is closest to the Scyllarus clustering preprocessor, but knowledge resides in stateful rules instead of an ontology of attacks.

A commercial product, Arcsight Enterprise Security Manager (ArcSight 2008), also ties correlated IDS reports to an installation’s security goals and vulnerability information.

10. Lisp Lessons Learned

The Scyllarus project has involved long term development, maintenance and modification of a large and complex Common Lisp code system. We have seen clear benefits from many aspects of Common Lisp, most notably the facilities for interactive development, hot-patching, etc. We have also discussed how well CL and Protegé work together, providing major assistance in building and maintaining Scyllarus’s IRM. However, our lessons learned include some ways in which CL was not helpful. One of these was less a problem with CL than an occasion where we missed an opportunity to profit from CL. We also found challenges in CL code maintenance.

One possible advantage of CL is providing better support for unit testing. Complex networks of inter-related objects are very challenging for unit testing regimes because setting up unit test situations often requires an inordinate amount of effort to recreate such networks outside of a fully-functioning system. The Java community, for example, has devoted a great deal of effort to this issue, along the way spawning a thick jargon of “mocks,” testing frameworks, etc. The Ruby community has been quick to claim that its “duck typing” provides solutions to some of the problems posed by Java’s more rigid type scheme.

Many of CL’s features offer opportunities to ease the process of unit test development. CLOS provides all of the flexibility of Ruby’s “duck typing” together with method combination and eql methods to ease the need for full-fledged mock object frameworks. Another advantage is not so much to do with CL itself as with the lisp mindset: it is our observation that lispers tend to assume that data should almost always have a readable and writeable representation. Having a readable printrep substantially simplifies the process of scripting tests, as anyone who has seen Java code with literally hundreds of lines to initiate relatively simple objects will attest. The :around methods and dynamic scoping are also powerful tools for setting up (and automatically tearing down) unit tests.

We say all this in some humility, because most of Scyllarus was written before unit testing became standard practice. Converts to unit testing, we have found that it has been enormously difficult to take the existing code, with its complex interrelationships, and decompose it so as to make it more unit testable. Doing so requires substantial refactoring to enable us to make use of the facilities we refer to above.

In one way, however, CL unit testing can present difficulties beyond those of more conventional languages, and that is that we often wish to conduct unit tests in the context of a running system. If one is writing a large Java system, for example, it is typically acceptable to compile the system, start it up, run the unit tests, and then close the system down. However, in developing a large lisp system, we often would like to be able to unit test our system without damaging its function; we do not want to shut it down after testing. This presents substantial additional challenges to test design.

We have found two substantial challenges in maintaining such a long-lived CL code base. The first is a
lack of strong data hiding mechanisms, notably limitations on access to object internals. By and large information hiding is managed by convention rather than language support — in our opinion the package mechanism is too heavyweight to simply hide access to some class slots. We are wary of the reliance on coding conventions, since they have not been at all stable over the lifetime of at least this code base, which was created at a very low time in CL’s fortunes. We are also not finding a “lisp culture” strong enough to orally transmit the culture of lisp to enough new programmers, making reliance on convention difficult (although we hope that the current renaissance will ease this problem). We are aware that many have argued that the absence of strong information-hiding is an advantage of CL, favoring expressiveness and flexibility, but we have seen development of Scyllarus move in fits and starts, and anything that would clarify interfaces in an “in your face” way would be helpful.

A second challenge has been the lack of linguistic support for APIs. We have found when, for example, adding a new subclass to an existing class, it is very difficult for a developer to know what new methods need to be coded. Sonia Keene (Keene 1989) and the CLIM standard (McKay and York 1993) both suggest using protocol specifications to overcome this problem. In our opinion this flies in the face of experience which indicates that documentation divorced from code (especially code developed in the informal, interactive style of CL) tends to stray from the implementation rapidly and lose its value. We favor some mechanism that “lives in” the code, evolves as the code does and, preferably, provides the programmer with warnings when he has failed to adequately implement a protocol. In related work (Goldman and Maraist 2008), for a limited case, we have developed macros for generic functions that warn programmers when they fail to fully implement an evolving interface. However that work is not sufficiently general.

There were also some minor nuisances that had to do with the age of the ANSI CL spec, which we encountered when we were making our code more portable. Scyllarus has run on Solaris, Linux, MacOSX and Windows. It was originally was developed in Allegro Common Lisp (ACL), and employed a number of proprietary ACL libraries, notably for sockets and multi-threading. We have developed our own portable CL libraries for these functions, and have successfully tested Scyllarus on Steel Bank Common Lisp (SBCL), as well. We expect that it would be easy to modify it to run on other CLs as well, although our socket and threading libraries would need to be extended. Finally, we doubt that it will come as an enormous surprise to serious common lispers that logical pathnames, and even conventional pathnames, were a nuisance to work with, and presented us with several portability challenges.

Acknowledgments

This material is based on work funded by the DARPA Scalable Network Monitoring program under contract to SPAWAR Systems Center. Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited.

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